Thesis Proposal Review

From Rhetoric to Policy: Security and Aid Discourse in Somalia

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Abstract
The global war on terror has ushered in the securitisation of a number of issues that would not have traditionally been identified as a 'security' problem (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009, 1156). It has blurred the lines 'between the 'neat' world of [aid and] development and the 'murky' field of national and international security (Brown and Gravingholt 2016, 1), most acutely in failed and weak states. Situated in securitisation discourse, the research analyses how foreign aid has been securitised, the processes and mechanisms through which traditional and non-traditional security adopt a securitised approach in Somalia. Taking the Copenhagen School's theory of securitisation as its starting point, the thesis aims to broaden its applicability to analyse the interplay of the aid-security nexus. The research adopts a critical discourse analysis and elite interviews to analyse the processes, methods and mechanisms of aid securitisation in Somalia. By analysing the speech and rhetoric of security actors and the linkages between aid and security vis-à-vis Somalia, the research hopes to analyse whether or not a discrepancy exists between the performative act of security and tangible security outcomes in Somalia under the guise of the global war on terror.

Introduction
The global war on terror has ushered in the securitisation of a number of issues that would not have traditionally been identified as a 'security' problem (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009, 1156). The research engages with the Copenhagen School of securitisation to test, demonstrate, and explore aid securitisation was largely promoted and using Somalia as a case study.

The research adopts a critical realist approach to security and is anchored in the Copenhagen School's theory of securitisation. The Copenhagen School's theory of security and securitisation is a particularly relevant departure point for a study of aid securitisation in a post-September 11, 2001 policy environment. It is also important in exploring aid securitisation's inadvertent impact in facilitating the emergence of an (in)security framework in sites that have experienced protracted conflict and have subsequently been deemed as 'safe havens' for terrorists.

Research Aims and Question(s)
The research adopts a critical discourse analysis which investigates and analyses the language, process and methods of aid securitisation in official documents of two traditional and two non-traditional security actors in Somalia: (i) the United Kingdom and the United States; and (ii) Turkey and the People's Republic of China, respectively. This approach is complemented by semi-structured elite interviews with key policy and decision-makers to ascertain the extent to which rhetoric influences donors' practices, aid flows, institutional structures and its material effect on Somalia. Theoretically, taking the Copenhagen School's theory of securitisation as its starting point, the thesis aims to broaden its applicability by proposing the emergence of an (in)security framework arises at the interplay of the aid-security nexus. Through case study use, the research will demonstrate how aid has been used, manipulated and strategized to minimise the existential threat posed by terrorism to donor states.

The research aims to:
- Map and examine how the securitising actors create, depict, imagine and articulate Somalia as an existential threat to justify extraordinary measures;
- Analyse how security construction is build and maintained; and
- Explore the material effects of securitisation.

The research asks:
  i.   Under what conditions is aid securitisation pursued? And what implications does it have in facilitating an (in)security framework?
  ii. To what extent has aid securitisation modified the distribution, prioritisation and implementation of foreign aid in Somalia?

Significance of the Research

Somalia, like Afghanistan and Iraq, has become frontier battlegrounds in America's global war on terror (Terdman 2008). The intersection of Somalia in aid securitisation discourse vis-à-vis terrorism is in its relative infancy. Whichever way you slice it, Somalia's volatility and state fragility has been framed as a threat to global and regional security in the context of the global war on terror (Keenan 2004, 475-476). Examining aid securitisation in Somalia allows for an exploration of the implications of wedding foreign aid, security, and counter-terrorism-contingent aid (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas 2010, 2). As a multi-donor aid environment, Somalia provides a critical and foundational empirical understanding of the tendencies, tension, struggles and interplay between foreign aid and security.

Literature Review

What do we know about foreign aid?
Foreign aid has played a prominent role in increasing economic growth, improving health and wellbeing outcomes and strengthening democratic institutions (Qian 2014, 2). From the Marshall Plan, the rebuilding of post-war Japan and other post-conflict reconstruction efforts to mitigate threats from the 'enemy,' foreign aid has inherently been securitised (Cassidy 2010, 69; Moss, Roodman, and Standley 2005; and Walker and Seegers 2012). Cassidy notes that foreign aid has 'long [been] used to win political allies and to promote regional security [and to further a donor nation-state's interests]' (Cassidy 2010, 69). Foreign aid, immediately in post-independence African nation-states, was primarily used to promote social, political and economic development (see John and Harry 2008, Fayissa and Mohammed 1999, Dovern and Peter 2007 and Kanbur 2000). Additionally, foreign aid demanded by recipient nation-states was designed to 'rebalance,' for want of a better word the exploitative nature of colonialism in Africa (Ayittey 1992 and Moyo 2009). Foreign aid can be categorised in to three broad categories: (i) economic development assistance; (ii) humanitarian relief aid; and (iii) military aid (Ayittey in Morris ed. 2002 and Akonkor 2008 and Alesina and David 2000). Somalia, since independence, has received all three of these categories of foreign aid. However, in the war on terror, it has become difficult to ascertain, distinctly, the type of foreign aid Somalia now receives.

Foreign Aid in Africa
The literature identifies four distinct phases of foreign aid in Africa. Phase I was primarily focused on bilateral aid. From independence in the 1960s to the early 1970s, aid was the primary source of economic development assistance for newly independent sovereign states. Economic development assistance in the form of foreign direct investment was limited to the extraction of natural resources (UNCTAD 1998, 116). Whilst the primary donors of bilateral aid were former colonial powers, the Soviet Union (in the form of military aid) and the United States began to play a prominent role in aid distribution in Africa (Ayittey 1992, 3). In Phase II, beginning in the early 1970s, we begin to see the emergence of multilateral organisations in the aid and development landscape (Ayittey 1992, 3-5). During this phase, multilateral aid has gradually begun to displace aid given bilaterally (Eberstadt 2000). This phase of foreign aid

was primarily focused on infrastructure development projects (i.e. schools, roads, telecommunication projects, agricultural projects, large-scale infrastructure projects, etc.) as a means to stimulate economic development (Eberstadt 2000).

Phase III, beginning in the early 1980s, marked a notable shift in foreign aid in Africa. The first two phases focused on improving the economic situation of recipient states. Phase III, however, was underpinned by emerging humanitarian crises throughout the continent (Ayittey 1992). Triggered by the oil crisis of 1979, the 1980s exposed the ineffectiveness of unconditional aid. Additionally, it also forced an internal reflection, by African nation-states, of the role of their own governments' policies in exacerbating 'Africa's economic morass' (Ayittey 1992, 4). It is during this phase that African leaders pursued the World Bank's structural adjustment programs (SAPs) to address the economic crises that highlighted their vulnerabilities during the 1980s (Ayittey 1992). SAPs facilitated two major developments: (i) the devaluing of their currencies; and (ii) reducing government expenditure primarily through the sales of underperforming state-owned enterprises (Karikari 2002 and Moyo, 2009). Phase IV was marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 where Western nation-states began to value the importance of exporting 'democracy' and conditional aid (Ayittey 1992). This phase of foreign aid and development focused on enshrining human rights to foreign aid recipients.

What do we know about security and development?
There has been a more strategic realignment of aid and development in failed and fragile states as an extension of both a donor and recipient nation-states' counter-terrorism strategy (Young and Findley 2011, Keefer and Loayza 2008). In the literature, two broad themes emerge: (i) securitisation has negatively impacted conflict-affected recipient nation-states; and (ii) a security-motivated agenda has largely been set and dictated by the United States of America (Brown and Gravingholt 2016; Fisher and Anderson 2015; Mercieca 2010). What is often misunderstood about aid securitisation in Africa, is the agency African nation-state have in setting and negotiating the aid agenda. Fisher and Anderson note that in some instances African nation-states have historically pursued a securitised aid and development agenda and 'are thus not victims of securitisation, but often its advocates and beneficiaries (2015, 132). This is true across four autocratic regimes in Africa: (i) Chad's Idris Deby; (ii) Ethiopia's Hailemairam Desalegn (2012-2018) and Meles Zenawi (1991-2012); (iii) Uganda's Yoweri Museveni; and (iv) Rwanda's Paul Kagame (Fisher and Anderson 2015, 132). These regimes have similar political 'births.' This is to say that they have all 'emerged from guerrilla movements, and all have constructed and entrenched authoritarian systems of rule in their respective states, which rely, on militarised governance (rather than democratic legitimacy) to function and maintain authority' (Fisher and Anderson 2015, 132). Furthermore, these securitising recipient nation-states have played a critical peacekeeping, state-building and counter-terrorism role in Somalia.

Conceptual Framework
To gain conceptual traction, the research is underpinned by securitisation theory, and aid securitisation.

Security and the Theory of Securitisation
In securitisation literature, the Copenhagen School's theory of securitisation has spawned a swathe of literature on securitisation, security, and threat; and its variant manifestations. Buzan defines security as the 'pursuit of freedom from threats' (1991, 18). Through its broadness, Buzan's definition of security invites critique and contestation (Smith 2005, 27) and it does not allow for contextual specificities (Baldwin 1997). Walt offers a 'traditional' and narrower

understanding of security as 'the stud[y] of the threat, use, and control of military force' (Walt 1991 in Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 3). However, Smith notes that 'security is what states make it' thus highlighting the ambiguous and arbitrary nature in which an issue and phenomena is determined to be a security threat (Smith 2005). Buzan's contribution to the scholarship on security aims to provide a 'broader framework of security [analysis from traditionally founded understandings of terrorism]' (Buzan 1983, 20). Buzan's conceptualisation of security calls for integrating a holistic approach to address and respond to contemporary security threats and an analysis on how a nation-state securitises these threats (Buzan 1983; Stone 2009, 2).

At its simplest, securitisation is the 'linguistic representation' (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998) of an existential threat. As such, securitisation is the process by which an issue, or phenomenon, is perceived and articulated as a threat rather than the actuality of the threat, per se. Therefore, the process of 'securitising' a threat legitimates the adoption of exceptional, and at times onerous, asymmetrical and draconian policy measures to address the phenomena identified as a security 'threat' (Waever 1995, 56).

Although criticised, the theory of securitisation is an important tool to critique the nature through which security threats are articulated and pursued. It argues for a broader and non-state-centric conceptualisation of security. Securitisation theory is not primarily concerned with the threat, but rather the process through which an issue or phenomena is constructed as a 'threat' (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 204). Therefore, security is defined as 'a quality actors inject into issues by securitising them' (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 204). By arguing that securitisation occurs when an issue or phenomena is a successful speech act, they demonstrate that, at its core, securitisation is a discursive act 'through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat' (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998, 491).

Successful securitisation occurs when the following three elements are present: (i) an existential threat; (ii) a heightened need for emergency action; and (iii) 'effect on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules' (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 26). At the policy level, securitisation is performative politics. This is to say, that the audience plays a critical role in legitimating the role of a securitising actor in the securitisation of an issue or phenomenon (Buzan 1991). Importantly, Brown and Gravingholt note that even when aid is invoked to pursue a securitised aim it 'does not ipso facto mean that aid cannot still be motivated by normative concerns about inequality and wellbeing and that the degree of securitization cannot vary over time or across donor and recipient countries' (2016, 2).

Aid Securitisation
The change in the global aid agenda is reflected not merely by humanitarian concerns that were conveniently placed on hold during the Cold War, but rather by an emerging realisation that the global South had the potential to contribute to instability (Duffield 2002). The securitisation of aid has become more pronounced since the poverty-terrorism hypothesis gained traction in policy discourses following the terrorist attacks in September 11, 2001. As such, poverty alleviation became a political and security priority rather than a humanitarian consideration. Security-relevant countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, those in the Sahel, and Somalia have thus received greater security-imbued aid focus (Robinson 2006, Fuast and Messner 2004). At the nexus of aid and security, aid securitisation demands and requires a nation-state to adopt exceptional measures when the issue is removed from the realm of 'normal politics' (Buzan,

de Wilde and Waever 1997, 24) and taken into realm of the politics of security. What is critical in understanding the aid-security nexus is determining whose security is served and serviced under the guise of development.

(In)security Framework
(In)security framework is the inadvertent outcome of the relationship between aid and security. It emerges when the aid attempted to increase, consolidate and strengthen security realities in recipient countries worsen/weaken as a result of the aid. It is an extension of the theory of securitisation, which aims to analyse the gaps and discrepancy in the securitisation process that has facilitated the emergence of an (in)security framework. Rhetorically deeming an issue/phenomenon as a security threat has a direct and causal impact on development and aid practice (Gavas 2006). Adopting and exploring an (in)security framework to further explore how security conditionality takes place in the securitisation process enables an analysis of institutional and praxis-based critique and exploration of: (i) changes in aid flows; (ii) emergence of new aid instruments; and (iii) increased multilateral development cooperation to achieve mutual security outcomes.

Research Design Methodology
The study is qualitative in nature and will derive results from critical discourse analysis and semi-structured elite interviews. It incorporates critical discourse approaches and interviews to analyse how securitisation occurs, the mechanisms and processes through which it is pursued and its material effects on aid and security in Somalia.

Cases within a Case Study Case: Choosing and Analysing Cases
The use of Somalia as a case study allows for a tracing of the effect of aid on terrorism and security. It provides a space to unpack, and where possible understand the repackaging, of historical and contemporary narratives from which critical junctures and mechanisms are drawn from (Collier 2008, Mahoney 2000 and Mahoney and Schensul 2006).

While Somalia is the test site, there are four case study nation-states that have variant security and development interests in Somalia. They are compartmentalised into two distinct groups: (i) traditional security actors - the United States and the United Kingdom; (ii) non-traditional security actors -the People's Republic of China; and Turkey. These security actors are chosen for the following reasons:
- (i) They have a military, strategic, economic and political interests in Somalia;
- (ii) They have a diplomatic, military, and strategic presence in Somalia; and
- (iii) They have each identified the need for security and stability in Somalia, thus securitising Somalia.

Each case consists of a sequence of events and motivations; aid priorities and traditions, and thus considered as individual cases. This allows for comparison and inference within and across cases: from the point of the securitising the 'threat' in a speech act; to the point of aid negotiation; aid administration; to the point of distribution; and practice to identifying and describing the discrepancies between different donors, their procedures and practices. It also obligates the research to be led by the information and data that the interlocutors provide rather than applying subjective and normative perspectives that can cloud the analysis.

Critical Discourse Analysis
The research will examine political speeches, policy documents and white papers to survey and study how security actors in Somalia shaped their securitisation policies. With each of the four

security actors, there have been implicit and explicit attempts to represent Somalia as a security threat and opportunity. Critical discourse analysis is 'an approach to language analysis which concerns itself with issues of language, power and ideology' (Coffin 2001, 99). It focuses on language as a mechanism to communicate and exercise power; and allows for an illustration of 'connections and causes which are hidden [in the discourse]' (Fairclough 1992, 9).

Fairclough's (1992) framework for critical discourse analysis, is 'an attempt to bring together three analytical traditions, each of which is indispensable for discourse analysis' (Fairclough 1992, 72). These traditions are:
- Close textual and linguistic analysis;
- A macro-sociological and tradition: analysing social practice in social and political structures; and
- An acknowledgement that people are active participants in producing and making meaning.

Discourse analysis involves examining and analysing official aid and development documents that make explicit references to the aid-security nexus and have informed aid securitisation policies. The purpose of which is to establish the language, meaning, nuance, and rhetoric used in these documents to map aid securitisation. Additionally, an array of secondary sources will be drawn upon, including grey literature such as reports and policy documents from not-for-profit agencies. One key limitation of document analysis is determining their accuracy, particularly as it relates to the official accounts of the Somali government. This in no way should imply that Mogadishu will deliberately mislead but rather that official documents may omit or alter key facts that is pertinent to the analysis. The research hopes to address this in two ways. Firstly, a triangulation and analysis of both official and unofficial documents will be required. Where possible, the research will privilege trusted unofficial documents. Secondly where official documents are concerned, an element of interpretivist analysis will be applied to uncover its subtext and expose omissions and alterations to analyse a rupture in the boundary between hidden and public transcripts (Scott 1999). Additionally, there is a further advantage in the use of primary documents in that it provides a timed pulse check on the process and developments (Selth 2007) of aid securitisation.

Selection of Primary and Secondary Texts
The research privileges the following primary sources:
- Securitising actor: Presidential, Prime Ministerial, Congressional, Parliamentary speeches, white papers, joint-statement.
- Implementing actors: United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia (UNSOM), African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), Africa Command (AFRICOM), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Kenyan and Ethiopian government communiqués.
- Securitised subject: Somali government documents; al-Shabaab speeches and publications
- Contextual actors: UN documents (i.e. resolutions, agency papers), reports by not-for-profit organisations operating in the region.

The approach will help to analyse how:
- Language influences the policy actions and choices taken by the securitising actor
  - What power is exercised; and communicated by the choices of words used

- In instances where the same referent object is cited –analyse what securitising moves are adopted by the securitising actor.

Limitations of Critical Discourse Analysis in non-Primary Languages

While there are no linguistic barriers to accessing to documents and communiqués in the English language, there are seemingly, obvious challenges to accessing and analysing documents in Turkish and Mandarin. Where translated documents exist, the research is not preoccupied with the literal translation of documents, as that's not the primary purpose of critical discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis is concerned with the nuances, meaning and power conveyed in the text. To compensate for the difference 'between the source language and the target language' (Shunnaq 1992, 104) it is important to ascertain the extent to which translation distortion is either intentional or unintentional. Given the nature of the chosen documents, it will be dubious to assume distortions of translations are intentional. The aim of adopting a discourse content analysis 'comprises a searching-out of underlying themes in the materials being analysed' rather than literal translations of documents (Bryman 2001, 381).

Another notable limitation of this approach is in minimising my own personal biases and ontological framework from influencing the analysis of the documents. This is particularly relevant for documents in Arabic and Somali. To minimise the possibility of bias 'contaminating' the analysis, the research will solicit the services of translators to perform quality control checks of the work. With documents in Turkish and Mandarin, and where the translated documents in English do not exist, the research will endeavour to get them translated. If this is not possible, those documents will, for pragmatic reasons, be excluded from the sample.

Data Collection

The following flow chart represents the steps and processes the research adopts to undertake a critical discourse analysis

Obtain, research, collate and consolidate of the documents

Group texts according to type and source (i.e. securitising actor, subject, implementer)

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┌─────────────────────────┐
│  Translate documents to │
│  English using expert   │
│  translators (those in  │
│  Turkish and Mandarin)  │
└─────────────────────────┘
             │
             ▼
┌─────────────────────────┐
│  Prepare the documents  │
│  for critical discourse │
│  analysis               │
└─────────────────────────┘
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
Semi-structure elite interviews

As such a fieldwork interview approach is preferred; bearing in mind that interview participants may be wary to speak formally, due to the nature of the topic; it may be useful to construct the interviews into informal conversations. Thus, a flexible inquiry method would guide the nature of the semi-structured interviews. This will also entail a reformulation of questions to not only stimulate engagement but to also ensure that the interview process is driven just as much by the participant as it would be by the researcher.

These interviews would supplement and draw out analyses derived from critical discourse analysis documents. I hope to conduct 20-40 fieldwork interviews with key policymakers and those of AMISOM, UNSOM, AFRICOM, and IGAD. The intended fieldwork will require identification of relevant stakeholders in the decision-making processes of aid securitisation, aid administration and distribution sites, most particularly key aid-security policy architects.

Research Plan

Table 1: PhD Timetable (February 2017-August 2020)

Period	Activity
February 2017	• Literature review • Research plan development
March –July 2017	• Coursework units –NSPO9020 and POGO9096 (Module One and Two)
March –November 2017	• Literature review • Development of thesis proposal • Conceptual familiarisation • Thesis proposal presentation preparation
November-December 2017	• ANU Fieldwork First Aid Training

January – September 2018	• Fieldwork Preparation:
	  • Research introduction to facilitate entry into the fieldwork
	  • Critical Discourse Analysis
	• Australasian Aid Conference Presentation
	• Thesis proposal presentation
	• Ethics Application –drafting, submitting, and making the necessary changes

October 2018 – May 2019	• Fieldwork data collection; data synthesis and preliminary data analysis
	  • September 2018-December 2018: Africa (Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Djibouti)
	  • January 2019 –May 2019: Security actors (Washington, London, Ankara/Istanbul, Beijing)

June 2019 –December 2019	• Critical Discourse Analysis and coding • Fieldwork interview transcription, coding and analysis
October 2019 –August 2020	• Thesis Chapter Drafts • Pre-Submission Thesis Presentation • Thesis Submission

Outline of Thesis
1. Introduction
   a. Contextualising the research
   b. Research question
   c. Significance of the research
2. Background Chapter
3. Literature Review
4. Conceptual Framework
5. Research Methodology
6. Qualitative Data Analysis –Theme One
7. Qualitative Data Analysis –Theme Two
8. Qualitative Data Analysis –Theme Three
9. Conclusion

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